Posts Tagged ‘nuclear safety’
“Is it true they have nuke stuff inside of them?”
“What happens if one gets busted open? Everyone gets all mutated?”
“If you ever find yourself in the presence of a destructive force powerful enough to decapsulate those isotopes,” Ng says, “radiation sickness will be the least of your worries.”
— Neal Stephenson, Snow Crash
At the present time, the people of Japan are struggling to deal with one of the most serious natural disasters anywhere in the world in recent recorded history. My thoughts are with them.
But I’ll get straight to the point. All right, what do we actually know about the effects of this disaster on Unit 1 at the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Station?
There are 53 operational nuclear power reactors in Japan today. Most of them were operating normally at the time of the recent earthquake, and continued to operate normally, since they were relatively far away from the earthquake’s epicenter. Some of them were offline at this time for routine scheduled maintenance or refueling. Several reactors, closer to the earthquake’s epicentre, experienced normal, automatic reactor trips (“SCRAMs”, in Western nuclear engineering parlance) controlled by the RPS (the Reactor Protection System), exactly as you would expect either in the presence of ground acceleration under earthquake conditions, or due to a loss of electricity grid connectivity to the plant (which is known as a Loss of Offsite Power, or LOOP, in nuclear power engineering parlance), which is a very likely event during a severe earthquake.
For the purposes of designing safe nuclear power plants, loss of offsite power is recognized as a relatively frequent, relatively high probability event. For the purposes of designing safe nuclear power plants, especially in Japan, it is recognized that the plant can be subjected to a severe earthquake – and on the Japanese coast, to tsunami surges as well.
And of those 53 power reactors, only one is behaving in a somewhat abnormal way in its shutdown state – Unit 1 at the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Station. (Fukushima Dai-Ichi, as opposed to Fukushima Dai-Ni, which is the Fukushima II plant.) The other 52 are completely normal, either operating or behaving as predicted in a shutdown state. To see that 52 out of 53 are behaving completely normally, and many are still operating normally, generating electricity on the grid, in the wake of one of the strongest earthquakes the world has ever seen in an industrialized area, shows you just how resilient nuclear power infrastructure is in response to natural forces like this.
Meanwhile, oil refineries and natural gas plants are pretty much all going up in flames in Japan’s earthquake-affected areas.
The absolute worst case scenario that we could potentially be looking at here is partial melting damage to the nuclear fuel – similar to the Three Mile Island accident. This will not harm any people or harm the environment, but it will have serious financial and political costs for TEPCO, it may write off the reactor, and it will be a significant political and rhetorical advantage for anti-nuclear activism and FUD.
If there is any real environmental damage to come out of this accident, it will come as a result of increased use of coal and fossil fuels instead of nuclear energy.
Fukushima I-1 is a General Electric BWR (Boiling Water Reactor), with a (relatively small) nameplate capacity of 460 MW. It first achieved criticality in October 1970, only 3 years after its construction commenced in 1967.
Fukushima I Unit 4, Unit 5 and Unit 6 were all already offline for maintenance and fueling operations at the time of the earthquake, and Units 1, 2 and 3 were shutdown automatically at the time of the earthquake, either by the RPS seismic sensors or by the RPS relays opening when off-site power was disrupted, completely as intended.
The control rods are all already fully driven into the reactors, and the reactors are fully subcritical. The systems are not even close to criticality and cannot reach criticality – or any measure of supracriticality – at all. This has been the case at all times following the initial RPS trips and control rod insertion at the time of the earthquake.
However, for a limited period of time following reactor shutdown, cooling of the reactor core still has to be maintained, to dissipate the decay heat of the short-lived fission products in the nuclear fuel. And that cooling, and how it is maintained, or not maintained, in the absence of offsite power, is at the root of our discussion of all this fuss at Fukushima.
Even with the reactor in a subcritical configuration, with control rods inserted, if the reactor core coolant level drops excessively and it is not replenished, over the course of the next 48 hours or so following reactor shutdown, the fuel can eventually heat up excessively from its decay heat, leading to core damage – partial melting of the fuel, which will be very difficult and costly to fix. This is not significantly dangerous for the people and the environment around the nuclear reactor. This worst-case scenario, damage to the fuel in the reactor core, is not dissimilar to the damage to the Three Mile Island Unit 2 PWR in the United States in 1979; although it is worth noting here that the TMI reactors are Pressurized Water Reactors and the Fukushima reactors are BWRs.
As the name suggests, however, the decay heat will decay away fairly rapidly – and the fuel’s thermal power output will drop below levels which are potentially problematic in the absence of proper cooling after a few days. It will take a few days for the fuel rods to stabilise their own temperature, in the absence of active water cooling, as the short-lived fission products in the fuel which are generating the heat continue to decay. The reactor will be then in what is known as “cold shutdown”. At that point, only minimal coolant injection into the reactor will be required, and preparations can be began to remove the nuclear fuel from the core.
We’re probably already not far from reaching this point, chronologically, at Fukushima I-1. The decay heat from the fission products in the fuel has been decaying constantly for the last couple of days, ever since control rod insertion at the time of the earthquake. We’re now reaching the point, over the coming few days, where the risk of further potential core damage has passed.
Following LOOP, most of a reactor’s instrumentation and emergency systems are generally transferred to a backup auxiliary power supply provided on site by diesel generators, or to batteries in the case of some systems. However, it appears that these generators at Fukushima I-1 were damaged by the earthquake. The diesel generator appeared to start up correctly, and then it stopped abruptly about an hour later.
So, what happens to a BWR, in terms of its decay heat removal, when the reactor is tripped, and offsite power is offline, and the auxiliary electric power supply from the diesel generators is offline?
To find out, we need to take a closer look at the BWR. To start with, here are a few little diagrams that basically illustrate the architecture of a typical BWR of the kind we’re discussing here. Click through for the full-sized images.
Wikipedia has a surprisingly good page on the safety systems of a Boiling Water Reactor, and I think that’s a very good place to start. It’s not too technical, since it is Wikipedia, after all, but it’s impressively good basic technically literate material for a Wikipedia article.
Like all light-water reactors, the GE BWR has a negative void coefficient. In other words, as the proportion of steam to liquid water increases within the reactor, the moderation of neutrons within the reactor is decreased, since the lower-density steam is less effective as a moderator, and the reactor’s average neutron energy spectrum hardens a little, and this causes the reactor’s neutronic power output to decrease, since the reactor is operating with an enriched uranium fuel in a typical neutron energy spectrum where hardening the neutron energy spectrum will decrease the fission power output.
A sudden increase in steam pressure within the BWR (caused, for example, by the closing of the main steam isolation valve from the reactor) will cause a sudden increase in the proportion of liquid water to steam within the reactor, which will cause an increase in the reactor’s power output, due to the negative void coefficient. Such an event is known as a pressure transient.
The BWR is specifically designed to suppress such pressure transients, by safely venting the overpressure through safety relief valves to below the surface of a pool of liquid water within the containment. This toroidal-shaped tank, known as the torus, is shown on the drawings above. There are 11 safety overpressure relief valves on the older generation of BWRs such as the ones at Fukushima, and only a couple of them need to be opened in order to completely mitigate a pressure transient.
Although a pressure transient will cause a transient in the fission power output for a brief moment, the rapid actuation of the pressure relief valves will cause the pressure to drop off rapidly, and correspondingly, the neutronic power will rapidly drop off once the valves are opened, to a level far below nominal operating power.
There is an intrinsic physical relationship between temperature, pressure and fission power output in a light-water reactor, because of the void reactivity coefficient.
The Emergency Core Cooling System, the ECCS, of a light-water reactor is made up a set of many interrelated, redundant layers of different safety systems which are designed to protect the nuclear fuel within the reactor pressure vessel from overheating in the event of the loss of coolant level, by maintaining that coolant level. To understand what’s going on at Fukushima, it is good to have a basic understanding of what these different systems are.
The Emergency Core Cooling System(s)
The High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) is the first line of defense in the ECCS. The HPCI is designed to inject substantial quantities of water into the reactor while it is at high pressure, and to prevent the activation of the additional, redundant low-pressure “layers” of the ECCS. HPCI can deliver approximately 19,000 L/min to the core at any core pressure above 690 kPa (100 psi). This is usually enough to keep the water levels sufficiently high to avoid activating the low-pressure “layers” of ECCS except in a major contingency, such as a large break in the makeup water line. The HPCI necessarily operates at a high pressure because it injects water into the reactor at a high flow rate against the high pressure already within the reactor, without releasing that pressure.
It’s worth noting here that whilst the Fukushima reactor may be losing coolant level at a limited rate through steam venting through the pressure relief valves into the torus, there is no pipe break, no stuck-open valve, or any other serious large-scale LOCA scenario here with a serious rate of coolant loss, which is the kind of thing the ECCS is designed to safely compensate for.
The HPCI system is powered by steam from the reactor – its operation is not dependent on off-site power, or power from the diesel generators, or battery power. It is powered by the heat remaining in the reactor itself.
It is completely plausible that a turbine trip, with sudden closure of the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) between the reactor and the turbine hall, will cause a significant power transient in the reactor, for the reasons described above, and steam venting into the relief valves as a result of that transient will cause some loss of the coolant level. The HPCI system is more than adequate to make up the reactor water level in this scenario.
The next one of the redundant components of the ECCS is the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, or RCIC. RCIC is also one of the high-pressure coolant injection systems, capable of injecting approximately 2000 L/min of water into the reactor core. The RCIC is able to operate with no source of electric power other than battery power, and is capable of providing decay heat removal by itself in the event of a station blackout, where off-site power is lost and the backup power supply from the diesel generators also fails.
If the water level cannot be maintained with the HPCI and/or the RCIC, and the core water level is still falling below some present point even with these systems working full-bore, then the next systems in the stack of ECCS systems respond. If, for some reason such as a large-break LOCA, the water level cannot be maintained, we then move to looking at the next layers of redundancy in the ECCS – the depressurisation and low-pressure coolant injection systems.
For the low-pressure coolant injection components of the ECCS to operate, the pressure within the reactor must be reduced, by the depressurization system. The Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) is designed to activate in the event that the reactor pressure vessel is retaining pressure, but the water level cannot be maintained using high pressure cooling alone, and low pressure cooling must be initiated. When the ADS activates, it rapidly releases pressure from the reactor vessel in the form of steam, through pipes that are piped to below the water level in the the torus, which is designed to condense the steam released into it, bringing the reactor vessel pressure below 32 atmospheres, allowing the low pressure components of the ECCS to be activated.
The low-pressure ECCS systems have extremely large capacities compared to the high pressure systems and are powered by multiple different power sources. They will maintain any required water level, and in the event of a worst-case LOCA, such as a break of a large water pipe feeding into the reactor vessel below core level, which could potentially lead to temporary fuel rod “uncovery”, they will rapidly return the water level over the fuel in the core prior to the fuel heating to the point where core damage could occur.
The Low Pressure Core Spray System (LPCS) is the first of the low-pressure ECCS components, designed to suppress steam generated by a major contingency. As such, it prevents the reactor vessel pressure from re-increasing above the LPCI coolant injection pressure, 32 atmospheres. It activates while the pressure in the reactor is still below 32 atmospheres, and delivers approximately 48,000 L/min of water in a deluge from the top of the core.
The Low Pressure Coolant Injection System, LPCI, is the final piece of the ECCS, the “heavy artillery” in the ECCS. Consisting of 4 pumps driven by diesel engines, it is capable of injecting a mammoth 150,000 L/min of water into the core. Combined with the core spray system to keep steam pressure in the core sufficiently low, the LPCI can suppress all core-cooling contingencies by rapidly and completely flooding the core with coolant. One should also note that the diesel-engine driven pumps that run the LPCI are completely independent of off-site electrical grid power, they are independent of steam power being extracted from the reactor (unlike HPCI), and they are independent of the diesel generators that provide the backup electricity supply for the plant in the event of the loss of offsite power.
The Standby Liquid Control System, the SLCS, is used in the event of major contingencies as a last-ditch measure to prevent core damage. It is not intended ever to be used, as the RPS and ECCS are designed to respond to all contingencies, even if multiple components of those systems fail, but if a complete ECCS failure occurs, it could be the only thing capable of preventing core damage. The SLCS consists of a tank containing a large quantity of water loaded with soluble nuclear poisons (such as boron) protected by explosively-opened valves and redundant battery-operated pumps, allowing the injection of the water into the reactor against any pressure within it. This water is fully capable of dissipating heat from the nuclear fuel; and the nuclear poisons in this water will send the system fully subcritical even if, somehow, insertion of the control rods has completely failed (which is not the case at present for any of these Japanese nuclear power reactors.)
The SLCS is a system that is never meant to be activated unless all other measures have failed to maintain integrity of the nuclear fuel. In the older generation of existing BWRs its activation could cause sufficient damage to the plant (due to the salts used as neutronic poisons causing corrosion and contamination of the whole nuclear steam supply system) that it could make the reactor inoperable without a complete overhaul.
There is now talk of pumping seawater into the reactor building; although the information in the press on this subject seems to be vague and confused. There is very little good, unambiguous information out there. Are we talking about spraying seawater within the reactor building, in order to condense steam and reduce the temperature and pressure? That seems to make sense. Are we talking about spraying seawater within the drywell to help cool the reactor pressure vessel, and reduce temperatures within the drywell? That also makes sense.
Surely it wouldn’t make sense to actually inject seawater within the actual Nuclear Steam Supply System, would it? This would cause significant problems with regards to contamination and corrosion of the entire nuclear steam supply system, which would be difficult, time consuming and expensive to rectify. Why would this ever be considered, when the SLCS and the ECCS systems are designed to perform the same function, safely and reliably, under adverse emergency conditions, without ruining the reactor? I do not expect that this is actually what is being planned – but again, the information that is tricking out through the hysterical mass media is so bad, it’s hard to tell.
The Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Design Basis Accident
(I’ve borrowed most of the material for this example scenario illustrated here from here.)
The Design Basis Accident (DBA) for a nuclear power reactor is the most severe possible single accident that the designers of the plant and the regulatory authorities could realistically imagine, as a contingency which the operators of the plant must be able to handle. It is, also, by definition, the accident the safety systems of the reactor are designed to respond to successfully, even if it occurs when the reactor is in its most vulnerable state.
The DBA for the BWR consists of the total rupture of a large coolant pipe in the location that is considered to place the reactor in the most danger of harm – specifically, for the older generations of existing BWRs, such as the Fukushima BWRs, the DBA consists of a “guillotine break” in the coolant loop of one of the recirculation jet pumps, which is substantially below the core waterline, and as such, has the makings of a very serious Loss of Coolant Accident or LOCA. The DBA scenario combines this large-scale loss of coolant with a simultaneous loss of feedwater to make up for the water boiled in the reactor (a loss of proper feedwater or LOFW), combined with a simultaneous collapse of the regional power grid, resulting in a loss of power to certain reactor emergency systems, or LOOP.
The BWR is designed to shrug this accident off without core damage.
The Design Basis Accident is not directly relevant to what happened to the reactor at Fukushima, but it is a good example to use to illustrate how the various different layers of the ECCS and the Reactor Protection System work under severe accident conditions, which is important background to a good understanding of what happened at Fukushima.
The immediate result of such a large-scale pipe break (we’ll call this time T+0) would be a pressurized stream of water well above boiling point shooting out of the broken pipe into the drywell, which is at atmospheric pressure. As this water stream flashes into steam, the pressure sensors within the drywell will report a pressure increase to the Reactor Protection System, within no more than 300 milliseconds; that is, by T+0.3. The RPS will interpret this pressure increase signal as the sign of a break in a pipe within the drywell. As a result, the RPS immediately initiates a full SCRAM, closes the Main Steam Isolation Valve (isolating the containment building), trips the turbines, attempts to spin up RCIC and HPCI using the residual steam, and starts the diesel-driven pumps for LPCI and the core spray.
Now, let’s assume that the LOOP occurs at this time, at T+0.5. The RPS is on an uninterruptable power supply, so it continues to function. The RPS immediately detects the loss of offsite power, however, and already enters a fully defensive state and trips the reactor and the turbine, if it has not already. Within less than a second from power outage, auxiliary batteries and compressed air supplies are starting the emergency diesel generators. Power will be restored by T+25 seconds.
(Remember that at Fukushima I, the backup diesel generator failed shortly after, but there was no real pipe break or LOCA. But never mind that, in the scenario we’re looking at here. In any case, remember that many of the ECCS sub-systems have different, redundant energy sources.)
Due to the rapid escape of coolant from the reactor core, HPCI and RCIC will fail rapidly due to loss of steam pressure, but this is immaterial, as the 2,000 L/min flow rate of RCIC available after T+5 is insufficient to maintain the water level; nor would the 19,000 L/min flow of HPCI, available at T+10, be enough to maintain the water level, even if it could work without steam, in the event of such a serious LOCA. At T+10, the temperature of the reactor core, at approximately 285 °C at this point, begins to rise as enough coolant has been lost from the core that voids begin to form in the coolant between the fuel rods and they begin to heat rapidly. By T+12 seconds from the initial LOCA, fuel rod uncovery begins. At approximately T+18, parts of the rods have reached 540 °C.
At T+40, the core temperature is at 650 °C and rising steadily; the LPCI and the pressure-regulating core spray kick in and begin deluging the steam above the core, and then the core itself. A large amount of hot steam still trapped above and within the core has to be knocked down first, or the water will be flashed to steam prior to it hitting the fuel. This happens after a few seconds, as the approximately 200,000 L/min of water these systems release begin to cool first the top of the core, with the LPCI deluging the fuel rods, and the core spray suppressing the generated steam until at approximately T+100 seconds, when all of the fuel is now subject to this deluge and the last remaining hot spots at the bottom of the core are now being cooled.
The peak temperature that is attained in the fuel elements in this scenario, even with temporary uncovery of the fuel rods, is 900 °C, well below the maximum of 1200 °C which is acceptable before fuel damage begins, at the bottom of the core, which was the last hot spot to be cooled by the water deluge.
The core is now cooled rapidly and completely by the LPCI, and following cooling to a reasonable temperature, below that consistent with the generation of steam, the core spray is shut down and the LPCI flow rate is decreased to a level consistent with maintenance of a steady temperature of the fuel rods, which will drop over a period of days due to the decay in fission-product decay power output within the fuel. After a few days, decay heat will have sufficiently abated to the point that defueling of the reactor is able to commence. Following defueling, LPCI can be shut down completely.
On March 12, there was an explosion near the Fukushima I-1 reactor building. What happened?
There are about 5 different layers of containment which exist, in a power reactor reactor like the ones at Fukushima, between the people outside and the potentially dangerous radioactive fission products within the nuclear fuel.
The fuel rods themselves are clad in tubes of zirconium alloy, and that represents one such layer. That nuclear fuel is inside the reactor pressure vessel, which is made of steel six inches thick, and that reactor vessel is the next such layer. The reactor pressure vessel is within the primary containment vessel, the drywell, which is made of steel one inch thick, and that represents the next such layer. The primary containment vessel is within the secondary containment structure, which is made of steel-reinforced, pre-stressed concrete between 4 and 8 feet thick. The reactor building which is built around the secondary containment structure is the last of these multiple layers of containment, and it is also made of steel-reinforced, pre-stressed concrete, between 30 cm and 1 m thick.
If every possible measure standing between safe operation of the plant and severe core damage and melting of the nuclear fuel fails, the containment can be sealed indefinitely, and it will prevent any significant release of radioactivity to the outside environment occurring under any circumstances.
Now, let’s look at some diagrams of these structures. Click-through for the full resolution images.
The outermost layer of the multiple layers of containment – the reactor building – has walls and a roof made of solid concrete, and it’s roughly cube-shaped.
On top of the concrete reactor building, however, there is an additional part of the structure – it is not made of concrete, but it is made of steel, with steel sheets over a steel frame. This steel building on top of the reactor building houses the fuel transfer crane, and it is built on top of the concrete roof of the reactor building. I’m referring to the part of the structure above the concrete shield plug and the refueling platform at the top of the concrete reactor building, as shown on the first of the diagrams above.
It is this relatively weak steel structure on top of the reactor building, which is not really part of the reactor building proper, which seems to have been blown out by a hydrogen explosion.
The explosion at Fukushima I-1 does not appear to have occurred within nor does it appear to have breached any of the fundamental layers of containment structure described above.
Now, an explosion has not occured as a result of a release of nuclear energy. That is a scenario that is simply outside the laws of reality. An explosion can be caused by one of two things; a chemical explosion, such as an ignition of a hydrogen-oxygen mixture, or a sudden release of stored gas or steam pressure.
It appears that the structure has probably been damaged as a result of a hydrogen explosion. It’s probable that excessive hydrogen generation within the reactor core, either radiolytically or chemically by reduction of water in the presence of the zirconium cladding at significantly elevated temperatures, has been vented into the torus, and as temperatures and pressures have began to rise within the torus steam pressure in the torus has been vented out into the reactor building surrounding the torus. From there, the hydrogen mixed with that steam and water vapor has risen, as hydrogen does, and worked its way through the reactor building, escaping at the top of the reactor building, and accumulating at the top, in the area around the fuel transfer crane. It appears that the accumulated hydrogen has then mixed with air and exploded.
Radiochemistry and radioactivity releases to the environment
When a light-water reactor is operating, some of the oxygen-16 in the water is activated into radioactive nitrogen-16, by the 16O(n, p)16N reaction. 16N is very short lived, with a half-life of only 7 seconds, but its specific activity is correspondingly very high. When a BWR nuclear power station is operating, the entire nuclear steam supply system, including the turbine hall, is a radiological controlled area, due to the radioactivity from 16N. However, after reactor shutdown, the 16N decays very quickly, reducing the radiation dose around the turbines to negligible levels basically immediately. This is one key difference between a BWR power plant and a PWR power plant – since the secondary coolant loop that drives the turbine in a PWR is isolated from the reactor’s primary coolant by the steam generator, the secondary coolant is never radioactive during reactor operation.
There can also be very small amounts of other radionuclides formed within the reactor coolant, for example tritium, which is formed by the fission of boron used as a soluble reactivity shim in the reactor coolant (if you really want to know: neutron capture on 10B forms an excited state in 11B, which splits apart into two 4He and 1 3H nuclei. A similar reaction occurs beginning from 11B, with the re-emission of one additional neutron in the breakup of the excited 12B nucleus), and 14C, which is formed from nitrogen compounds such as hydrazine which are added for pH control and oxygen scavenging in the reactor coolant.
If excessive pressure within the torus or within the primary containment vessel is vented out into the reactor building, and from there it is allowed to escape out into the atmosphere, then small amounts of these radionuclides may be released out into the atmosphere, which is a possible scenario we might be seeing at Fukushima.
(A quick note on terminology: Radiation is not a substance, and it cannot leak, nor contaminate a person. To speak of an escape of radiation from a nuclear power station is kind of like to speak of an accidental leak of light from a lightbulb factory. What we are talking about here is a possible release of radioactivity, of a substance containing a radioactive nuclide.)
We will know, over the next few days, exactly what the true situation is regarding the composition, and quantity, of any releases of radionuclides into the outside environment. It’s very easy to detect radioactivity, to measure it quantitatively with high precision, and to discriminate the presence of different radionuclides and identify them.
What I suspect we might see from some anti-nuclearists, however, is something that we saw after Three Mile Island, and something that we still see on rare occasions up to the present day in regards to TMI – the conspiracy theories.
Some people will probably try and claim that there were actually enormous releases of radioactivity into the environment and it was never really measured or documented – or that it was measured and known that there were huge releases of radioactivity into the environment at Fukushima, but there’s a big conspiracy by big bad unethical TEPCO or by the Big Bad Nuclear Industry in a more general sense (and by the evil government and the conspirators at the IAEA, and the armies of Big Nuclear Shill bloggers, of course!) to cover it all up! We saw this once or twice after TMI, and I think we’ll see it again from those who are truly devout believers in the absolute, unmoderated evil of the Big Bad Nuclear Industry.
Of course, that’s absolute nonsense, for exactly the same reasons that it’s nonsense in the context of TMI. You simply cannot ever, in any context, release a very large amount of radioactivity into the atmosphere and cover it up or keep it quiet.
Look at Chernobyl for example. The Soviets didn’t tell the West about it immediately – they didn’t even tell their own nuclear scientists. Soviet nuclear experts found about it when radiation sensors at nuclear research sites and nuclear power plants (eg. the Ignalina plant in what is now Lithuania) across the eastern USSR started going off, and the West found out about it when radiation sensors at Sweden’s Forsmark NPP and other Swedish nuclear engineering facilities started going off. (For more on this note regarding Chernobyl, see the excellent first chapter of Richard Rhodes’ excellent Arsenals of Folly.)
Nuclear power plants and other facilities that use radioactive materials are all over the place in our society, and they all have sensors and instruments to make sure everything is safe and radioactive contamination does not occur. If a Chernobyl-style event occurs, you will detect it at any such site. Any nearby NPP. Any nearby molecular biology lab working with radiolabels. Any nearby physics lab. Any nearby clinic working with X-rays or medical imaging. Anyone nearby developing photo film.
If a person who has recently had a radiopharmaceutical medical imaging procedure walks into a nuclear power plant or physics lab, or a radiation detector installed at a border crossing or port around the USA, they’ll set off alarms.
Radioactivity is so easy to detect that in 1896 Becquerel discovered it accidentally.
I remember that there was a case, in November of 2008 I think, where a little bit of radioactive 133Xe was vented from the ANSTO Lucas Heights radiopharmaceuticals facility… this was quickly detected in Melbourne by the atmospheric radiochemistry monitoring station which is part of the network being developed for the CTBTO for CTBT verification… one of a large network of such sites, which are extremely sensitive, all around the world which are used to detect any possible nuclear weapon test.
Japan, and Hong Kong and mainland China have plenty of expertise and infrastructure that they can use to, for example, perform the sensitive analysis of fission-product radionuclides in the atmosphere to monitor nuclear weapons testing and nuclear fuel processing in the DPRK… so they can also certainly analyse the presence of traces of artificial radionuclides in the atmosphere from this nuclear power plant incident.
How many nuclear power stations are there in the United States that are located relatively close to TMI, in the states geographically around TMI? What did their radiological monitors show? Anything? Photographic films from everyone around the area was collected and looked at – no radiation was recorded.
Basically, the whole idea of such an enormous cover up is just an enormous, impractical conspiracy theory – which would need to involve the state government, the federal government, the nuclear energy industry, and huge numbers of the public and huge numbers of scientists and industries – like an Apollo hoax conspiracy theory.
We will know, over the next few days, exactly what the true situation is regarding the composition, and quantity, of any releases of radionuclides into the outside environment. There are no coverups or conspiracies in this context – there simply cannot be.
I hope you’ve found this post helpful. Please feel free to post comments, with any further discussion, questions, criticisms or what-have-you. I will likely follow up this post with a future post, following future developments of this issue, and responding to questions or new information.
Australian Greens senator Scott Ludlam has again this week called for Australia’s 20 MW OPAL research reactor to be closed down, following reports that a minor problem with the neutron reflector in this “tank-in-pool” reactor has yet to be rectified.
The facility has been out of operation for 11 of the past 14 months, during which time Australia has had to rely on costly imports of medical and scientific radionuclides from foreign suppliers in South Africa and Canada.
The OPAL reactor core sits in the centre of a heavy water neutron reflector, which itself sits within the reactor’s large pool of light water, as we see in the above diagram.
In the centre of the circular heavy water vessel is the nuclear fuel itself, an array of 16 fuel assemblies. The large and small holes that pass through the entire height of the reflector, into the reactor core, support the generation of products such as transmutation-doped silicon and medical and scientific radionuclides as well as supporting neutron irradiation experiments. Several different neutron beamlines are also installed into the reactor, set up for different neutron spectra, including a liquid deuterium moderated cold neutron source.
Here, the square reactor “core” is clearly visible in the centre of this photograph, illuminated strongly by its own Čerenkov radiation, with the round neutron reflector surrounding it, pierced by the aforementioned ports for the irradiation of samples, with the greater reactor pool, containing light water, surrounding that.
The purpose of the neutron reflector is to improve neutron economy in the reactor, and hence to increase the maximum neutron flux – neutron flux being a fundamentally important metric of the performance and usefulness of a research and isotope production reactor.
To maximise the neutron flux or neutron economy in the reactor, heavy water, being a good moderator, basically a material from which elastic scattering of neutrons readily occurs, is used to construct a neutron reflector, immediately surrounding the reactor.
You’ve got light water from the pool seeping into the heavy water neutron reflector that surrounds the reactor. So, the light water from the pool is “leaking” into the reactor components, in towards the reactor. The reflector vessel is kept at a lower pressure than the light water at ambient pressure in the reactor pool. Any leakage pathway at all will allow light water to seep into the reflector vessel, diluting the heavy water. This issue was first identified in December of 2006, following commissioning of the new reactor, and attempts have been made to address the problem during an extended shutdown, which have been somewhat, but not totally, successful.
The sole consequence of this is that it dilutes the expensive heavy water. Of course, some people, and some media reports, seem to persist in documenting such a “leak” as though it were luminous green radioactive goo tricking out into suburban Lucas Heights.
If the heavy water is diluted to any significant extent, the efficiency of the neutron reflector is diminished, and the neutron flux that is achieved under nominal operating conditions is diminished, making the reactor less efficient for neutron beam experiments, neutron irradiation or radionuclide production. There is absolutely nothing here of any health physics or safety significance, at all, period. This dilution of the heavy water in the reflector vessel has absolutely no significance with regards to safety of the facility.
The Greens have derided ANSTO’s comments on the nature of the fault as “spin” and link these technical concerns to some kind of supposed, imaginary potential for safety concerns in the future. Of course, Ludlam wouldn’t know what a neutron reflector was if it bit him, and he has a proven track record of carrying on fervently about issues of nuclear science and technology, whilst possessing an alarming lack of understanding of such science and technology; especially for a federal politician.
Once the heavy water in the vessel becomes diluted, the only way to un-dilute it is via the same methods of deuterium enrichment such as those originally used to make it – such as distillation, or the Girdler sulfide process. In the case of a high deuterium concentration, as in a tank of somewhat diluted heavy water, distillation is the best option. Apparently, ANSTO are planning to construct a small-scale heavy water re-distillation system for online re-enrichment of some of the heavy water passing through the reflector circulation loop. This will fully counteract the problem, and allow the use of the reactor with the fullest efficiency for research and isotope production.
Anyway, Senator Ludlam and the Greens are not just content with calling for the reactor to be shutdown until the heavy water dilution issue can be rectified or nullified, however – they are quite adamant in calling for the permanent shutdown of the reactor.
“We think the safest solution for this reactor is for it to be shut down and for the waste to be contained properly,” Greens senator Scott Ludlam said this week. Importing radionuclides from international suppliers such as in South Africa and Canada could continue, he said.
In addition to the production of medical radionuclides, the reactor is used to produce neutron-transmutation-doped silicon boules for microelectronics – a valuable commercial service marketed by ANSTO – as well as for the production of radiopharmaceuticals and scientific radiochemicals. The radionuclides, most of them employed in nuclear medicine, typically commonly produced with ANSTO’s reactor, are thus:
Samarium-153 – 1.93 days
Molybdenum-99 – 2.75 days
Indium-111 – 2.83 days
Iodine-131 – 8 days
Chromium-51 – 27.8 days
Iodine-125 – 59.4 days
Half-lives are as indicated. The short half-life of 153Sm, the basis of the onocological radiopharmaceutical Quadramet, in particular means that importation of this radionuclide is difficult and impractical, and it is essentially unavailable in the absence of an operating isotope production reactor in Australia.
We’ve learned from painful experience that the supply of expensive imported radionuclides has been subject to delays or interruptions to supply during shutdowns of OPAL (and HIFAR) in the past. On the basis of ANSTO’s past experience, it can reasonably be assumed that still worse problems would arise if Australia were to be totally reliant upon imported radionuclides. The supply problems arise from a range of causes, such as weather delaying flights, aviation regulations relating to radioisotopes being carried with other goods, or opposition from freight pilots.
The International Atomic Energy Agency has identified the “growing problem of refusal by carriers, ports and handling facilities to transport radioactive material” as a significant problem for nuclear medicine and scientific research involving radionuclide importation across the world, and has initiated processes intended to identify ways in which it can be overcome. A number of international, such as British Airways, no longer accept carriage of radioactive material, and others have imposed tight restrictions. Unless a way can be found to reverse such trends, shipments of radionuclides across the world will become increasingly problematic.
The reactor and its associated neutron guides and instruments are used for neutron radiography, neutron scattering imaging, neutron reflectometry and other advanced neutron-beam based research and technological applications, neutron activation analysis, for example for forensic applications, as well as the analysis and testing of materials under neutron irradiation and research into the potential for Boron Neutron Capture Therapy as a potent weapon against cancer – which requires the patient to be bought to a nuclear reactor to produce the thermal neutron flux required.
Even if some radionuclides can be imported, clearly our research reactors in Australia are of significant importance and usefulness in such fields. If radionuclides are to be imported from foreign suppliers, they are still being produced in similar nuclear reactors – if a research reactor is such a dangerous thing, as is suggested by these groups, why should foreign nations be subjected to such a burden for the production of radiopharmaceuticals which are for the benefit of us? Why shouldn’t we take responsibility for our own reactor, if we have decided that we value the benefits of its products, and we’re not prepared to forgo them?
This is worth checking out.
I will quote a few sentences from the website, to show what this group is generally about.
The EFMR Monitoring Network is a non-profit, non-partisan organization which monitors Three Mile Island Unit 1 (TMI) and Peach Bottom Atomic Power Stations 2 & 3. The Group was formed out of a Settlement with GPU Nuclear in 1992 relating to Post-Defueling Monitored Storage at TMI-2. In January 1999, the new owners of TMI-1, AmerGen, (PECO Energy & British Energy) agreed to terms with EFMR through 2006. Additionally, EFMR expanded its monitoring and research activities to include Peach Bottom 2 & 3 as a result of Universal Settlement relating to the merger of PECO Energy with Commonwealth Edison.
This is not your average dogma-packed “no nukes, no nukes, no nukes” activist group. Nowhere in their mission statement does it call for or support the closure of existing, operating, safe fission power plants.
EFMR maintained five low-volume air samplers on the east and west shores of the Susquehanna River opposite of TMI from 1993-1999. Dickinson College Physics Department collected the filters and cartridges of these monitors on a weekly basis. Analyses performed included, but were not limited to, weekly gross beta and alpha measurements, monthly gamma isotopic analysis, weekly Iodine-131 analysis, and semi-annual Strontium-90 analysis. The last collection occurred in December, 1999.
In November, 2000, EFMR deployed a low-volume air sampling station at Peach Bottom.
This is a neat idea! Of course, every nuclear power plant meticulously monitors any discharge of the very small amounts of radionuclides into the atmosphere or other effluents, and these records are all meticulously filed with the NRC, and are a matter of public record.
However, if they want to provide an extra layer of data, and extra monitoring apparatus, by themselves, then so much the better.
Having such data collected by independent means, and analysed by local college physicists, has every potential to:
a) Eliminate any community distrust of nuclear utilities.
b) Dispel the myth that nuclear power plants emit any aetiologically significant amounts of radioactivity into the environment at all during their operation.
c) In the event of a severe incident such as the Three Mile Island accident, improbable as though it may be, provide independent data to confirm the true magnitude of any release of radioactivity, and dispel baseless and false speculations or claims of very large and aetiologically significant releases of radioactivity being “covered up”
e) Educating people about natural background radiation and radioactivity and its sources, including atmospheric nuclear weapons testing, cosmic radiation and fossil fuel combustion, as well as about basic radiation instrumentation and health physics.
The only potential for a problem that I can foresee with this is that controversy may be generated over very small radioactivity releases which can be detected above background by sensitive instruments, which are however not in excess of NRC and EPA regulatory limits, and are of no public health significant – just like the controversy surrounding tritium effluents at certain nuclear generating stations in the US in recent years.
PECO has also agreed not use Mixed Uranium Oxide (MOX) fuel at Peach Bottom 2 & 3, Limerick Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2, and Salem Nuclear Station 1 & 2.
Well, I must say, I don’t agree with that. What is their reasoning behind making such a demand of the utility? What’s so bad about the use of MOX? I can think of several good points to be made of the use of MOX as a fission reactor fuel.
AmerGen has ensured that its work force meets or exceeds NRC staffing requirements and has agreed to pay excess decommissioning costs for TMI-1. AmerGen also agreed not to conduct business with any company, organization or nation that the United States of America is boycotting for economic or military reasons.
Well, how can you argue with any of that? Of course, the owner pays decommissioning costs for TMI-1, just like they pay the costs of decommissioning any other unit. I don’t think this represents any shift away from the obvious, in terms of the utility’s policy – the only difference being that TMI-2 will of course cost a bit more to decommission completely than the average reactor. I see no reason to believe that the TMI-2 accident will in any way affect the decommissioning of TMI-1 at the end of its life.
Of course any nuclear utility should meet or exceed anything the NRC requires of it. (If the NRC’s requirements are thought to be inappropriate, or too strict, or too soft, or whatever, then you take that up with the NRC – but of course the utilities should be by the book.)
EFMR has on-line access to AmerGen’s Reuter-Stokes, gamma monitoring system. This sensitive system collects samples, analyzes them, and prints out data on an hourly basis from 16 separate collecting stations located within a four mile radius of Three Mile Island. EFMR continues to attend NRC meetings, and receive regular briefings and updates from AmerGen, Exelon, and PECO Energy.
To monitor radiation levels surrounding the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station and the Peach Botom Atomic Power Station so that any deviation from normal background radiation levels are immediately detected and reported. This allows for a prompt response from our citizens network to provide independent data, especially in the event of another accident or any radiological release in the area.
If abnormal levels are detected, EFMR may report the data to proper authorities including the PA Department of Environmental Protection, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and others.
The network is comprised of ordinary citizens whom each record five radiation measurements per day. Each person had been provided a geiger counter equipped with an electronic timer to measure radiation levels.
At the end of each minute, it displays the counts in a liquid crystal display window. That user then writes the count on a data sheet along with the time and weather conditions. The monthly data sheets are collected and reviewed by professional advisors.
We also utilize five stationary low-level air samplers located within a two mile radius around Three Mile Island. These monitors are able to distinguish and record Alpha and Beta radiation. The data is collected by the Dickinson College physics Department and analyzed quarterly. A control station low-level air sampler is located a Dickinson College for comparison.
EFMR has distributed 75 RadAlert radiation monitors at 50 stations in an eight county area around Three Mile Island, including numerous colleges, high schools and community-based organizations. Several additional monitors are deployed in northern Maryland close to the York County border. In addition, EFMR will deploy 30 rad alerts in close proximity to Peach Bottom as a result of its Agreement with PECO Energy.
This all sounds good to me. Of course, the data taken needs to be analysed by those who understand what they’re doing, and in the event of any unusual and potentially release of radioactivity, the NRC and authorities need to be notified so that they may determine the most safe, prudent and rational course of action – of course, the utility will almost certainly be the first to notify the NRC, in any accident scenario.
The anti-nuclear lobby, and many environmentalist groups, could do well to learn from this group.
Many of you will be familiar with, or will have followed, this recent post on The Oil Drum, discussing nuclear energy. There’s a very lively and certainly very heated discussion thread there.
Now, comment submission is now closed for that post – but I can’t help but be a little stubborn and have the last post, responding to a couple of anti-nuclear-energy posts that I cannot help myself but take the oppurtunity to rebut.
“a direct, high-speed hit by a large commercial passenger jet would ‘have a high likelihood of penetrating a containment building’ that houses a power reactor. According to the NCI, such an incident could cause a significant release of radiation into the environment and result in tens of thousands of cancer deaths.”
Well, here’s the EPRI study concerning aircraft crash attacks against a nuclear power plant:
“In both cases, the analysis conservatively assumed that the engine and the fuselage strike perpendicular to the centerline of the structure. This results in the maximum force upon impact to the structure for each case.
The analyses indicated that no parts of the engine, the fuselage or the wings—nor the jet fuel—entered the containment buildings. The robust containment structure was not breached, although there was some crushing and spalling (chipping of material at the impact point) of the concrete.”
That doesn’t exactly agree, does it?
“Not to mention the case of an actual war or sabotage.”
In terms of deliberate sabotage, say by terrorists, what kind of attack would actually be needed, in real-world terms, to actually destroy a nuclear reactor and breach its containment vessel, causing a radiological impact on the environment? Could it happen in practice, at all?
“The evacuation plan for the plant covers a 10-mile radius from the plant, but the federal government also has emergency readiness plans for a 50-mile “ingestion plume pathway” that includes New York City.”
“My little ‘thought experiment’ is what a government emergency readiness plan says.”
So what? None of those evacuation plans or emergency planning zones have ever, ever needed to be put into practice in the United States to protect the public from a commercial nuclear power accident.
The notion that there’s a 50-mile radius or whatever that corresponds to some emergency readiness planning, and therefore it’s entirely plausible that a commercial power reactor could injure or kill everyone within a 50-mile radius is complete nonsense.
Tell ya what – I’ll bother tracking that down and posting once you go ahead and show that fission power is so safe that it no longer needs the special Price-Anderson law that makes the industry a possibility.
Showing how Price-Anderson is unnecessary is an open challenge – feel free to take it up.
But hey, instead of creating fake stuff, and calling it true (a habit of the pro-fission people in this topic it seems) why not just head on address Price-Anderson – show how fission is so safe it doesn’t need the protection.
In the entire history of commercial nuclear power in the United States – over 100 reactors operating, and 50 years of reactor operation – commercial nuclear energy in the United States has never hurt or killed anybody, and not one single cent of government money has ever been paid out under Price-Anderson.
I don’t believe Price-Anderson is necessary – the experience over the last 50 years shows that.
“I see. So your position is US centric. That’s fine, but there are other nations. Many have signed up to the peaceful atom program. So magically THEY are going to be as responsible as in the US?”
Is this basically implying that you think nations such as, say, South Korea, Japan, France, China, India or South Africa are intrinsically incapable of safe nuclear engineering, but the US is? Are you implying that these nations are going to build Soviet-style RBMK reactors with positive void coefficients and no containment vessel and operate them in the way that the Soviets did, with absolutely no safety culture?
If I was a representative of those nations, their leaders, and their engineers, I’d almost take offence at that.
Isn’t this the most tasteless propaganda you’ve seen all year?
Indian Point Nuclear Dead Baby* World Tour. It’s affiliated with the creator of a certain other crazy lepidopterological anti-Indian Point blog. You all know the one.
* Disclaimer: The site does not actually include any references to any actual real children hurt or harmed by nuclear energy.
Now, let’s see.
“To bring attention to this issue, to oppose Entergy’s attempts to relicense these dangerous reactors, this blog will be sending symbolic dead babies (dolls) out on a world tour by leaving them at various locations.”
So, unfortunately, you couldn’t find any actual babies hurt or killed or harmed by nuclear energy, for real, in the real world?
Apparently, whilst there’s no evidence of any kind that nuclear energy actually does hurt or harm or kill real babies in the real world, it however does symbolically kill babies.
My god, won’t anybody think of the symbolic children?
“First, it seems only fair that Andrea speak, since this Indian Point Dead Baby Tour is about them, the dolls, and who it is they represent in this battle.”
Oh, silly me. It’s about dolls? Indian Point kills dolls? Not actual real, living, human babies? It seems I was misled to believe that there are somehow actual living children being killed by Indian Point… I must have been mistaken.
I hate to break it to you like this, but they’re dolls. They’re not alive – if Indian Point is killing dolls, it must be pretty dangerous indeed… right?
First, some important news on our forward progress on this environmental direct action campaign:
3. Buried three dolls in the mulch in my backyard gardens in the hopes of giving them a bit of a different soiled look, and took some incredible photographs that I hope to load onto my hard drive, again on Sunday.
That’s your environmental direct action campaign? I’m trying not to laugh.
“The doll is so elegant, that it is going to be the doll shipped over to Elena in the Ukraine with the hope that she will agree to take it with her on her next motorcycle trip through Chernobyl’s fallout zone.”
On her website, Elena Filatova posted photographs of her alleged motorcycle trips in the area around the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, 18 years after the power reactor disaster there. She mainly visited the virtually abandoned city of Pripyat, Ukraine.
Filatova took a large number of photographs of buildings, cottages, rusting carnival equipment, the interiors of schools and homes, and even a couple people who had since returned to the area. The photos are arranged in the form of a story presented as an account of a trip by a biker who got a permit to travel alone in the radiation zone. However, Chernobyl tour guides and tourists to Chernobyl have claimed that Filatova visited the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone only as part of an organized tour. Chernobyl tour guide Yuriy Tatarchuk recalls that Filatova “booked a tour, wore a leather biker jacket and posed for pictures.” Her website appeared soon after.
“There is no bigger myth within the nuclear energy than their claim that nuclear energy and commercial reactors are and environmentally friendly CO2 source of electricity. From the very beginning of the uranium fuel cycle, the massive creation of and dumping of CO2 into our environment begins, as well as a trail of far deadly contaminants. First, you have to get the uranium out of the ground…uranium mining is very equipment intensive, and the large pieces of equipment use MASSIVE amounts of fossil fuels. Further, it takes tons and tons of of ore containing trace amounts of uranium to get enough actual raw uranium to be of any use. This means said materials have to be carted to processing plants…again, said transportion of such vast quantities of these raw start up materials burn up vast amounts of carbon based fuels, adding to nuclear CO2 contributions to Global Warming.”
Yes, the mining of uranium, the enrichment of uranium, the construction of reactor infrastructure and so forth consumes energy, in just the same way as mining and refining bauxite into aluminium to construct massive wind turbines, along with the construction of the infrastructure itself, consumes large amounts of energy, often generated via relatively polluting energy sources, such as burning fossil fuels.
The independently produced, accredited, Environmental Product Declarations for Swedish energy utility Vattenfall’s Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant find that, averaged over the entire lifecycle of their nuclear power plant including uranium mining, milling, enrichment, plant construction, operating, decommissioning and waste disposal, the total amount of CO2 emitted is 3.3g per kWhe .
The proposed Woodlawn wind farm pro ject in New South Wales has also made available a detailed Environmental Impact Statement, in which greenhouse gas emissions are quantified on a whole-of-life-cycle basis.
Excluding values for wind farms that are significantly different from the proposed Woodlawn Wind Farm, GHG emissions on a life cycle basis range from 7-20 kg CO2e /MWh. This represents the GHG emissions from all activities, including the construction, transportation, assembly and operation of the turbines.
The idea that whole-of-life-cycle analysis can demonstrate that nuclear energy is unsustainable, both on an energy intensity basis and a greenhouse gas intensity basis, is based on a very limited set of highly dubious science, which has been widely rebutted, and found to be irreconcilable with the body of scientific literature established relating to the energy and greenhouse gas intensities of the nuclear fuel cycle.
I could go on, but this same bullshit argument has been done over, and over, and over, and over so many times… I’m sick of repeating myself.
“What lunacy sees the world wanting to build 2200 new nuclear reactors when the first 437 aging reactors have been such a dismal failure, and killed so many innocent people?”
Nuclear energy is the largest source of greenhouse gas free electricity in the world, and it is also the safest – one of the safest industrial enterprises in existence. Aside from Chernobyl, commercial nuclear power, operated safely in the Western world, has harmed or killed almost nobody – megawatt-hour for megawatt-hour, wind turbines, for example, are far more dangerous. I’d call that quite a success story, and I challenge anybody to provide credible evidence to the contrary, if they disagree.
“Look just under the surface of the commercial nuclear industry, and you find a trail of death…it is no coincedence that every county within 100 miles of a nuclear facility has elevated cancer rates when compared with counties outside of that 100 mile circle. Look at both wars in the Middle East (Desert Storm, and the Iraq War), and you find our soldiers coming home with strange illnesses, illnesses caused by their overexposure to depleted uranium. Already in Iraq, mothers are giving birth to children with horrible deformities, deformities caused by that same exposure to Depleted Uranium, and where does that Depleted Uranium come from? The production cycle employed to produce fuel for commercial nuclear reactors.”
Is there any credible physical evidence, any evidence of any kind, that “every county within 100 miles of a nuclear facility has elevated cancer rates when compared with counties outside of that 100 mile circle”?
What does the use of uranium munitions have to do with nuclear power? Nothing!
“That’s one of the big problems with the nuclear cycle…there is no such thing as the peaceful atom, no matter how you try to dress it up. Additionally, anywhere nuclear goes in all of its various forms, death is soon to follow. From its earliest days, even pre-dating the Manhattan Project, the exploration and exploitation of uranium has brought with it horrid deaths, devastating cancers, birth defects and destruction on a level almost unimaginable.”
Is there any evidence of any kind to support such claims in the real world?
“Going further, George Bush, our government, our military machine opposes Iran gaining the capability of enriching uranium for a very simple reason…with the capability of enriching said uranium for nuclear reactors, you gain as a part of the waste stream from enrichment operations the byproduct of Depleted Uranium.”
“You see, our Pentagon needs the commercial nuclear industry, and the infrastructure it takes to power it for its own evil purposes, including vast stockpiles of Depleted Uranium, which is used in numerous weaponry to make armour piercing ammunitions and war heads.”
Riiight. The uranium used in anti-tank kinetic penetrator munitions really doesn’t care what isotopic composition it is… Natural uranium, with no enrichment or depletion of particular nuclides, is perfectly usable for this purpose. Depleted uranium is not specifically required for this application at all.
“As our campaign moves along, we’ll share many of these photographs with our readers, but tonight, thought I would share a peek into the dolls long involvement in the Nuclear Industry, by introducing you to Priscilla and some of the members of her family who were forced, like many of our soldiers to endure nuclear bomb testing under the guise of the Friendly Atom and CHEAP ELECTRICITY.”
Exactly what, at all, does nuclear weapons testing have to do with generating electricity? Absolutely nothing.
“The tragic events surrounding the horrific aftermath of Japan’s 6.8 on the richter scale earthquake show us just how fragile and vulnerable nuclear reactors really are.”
The effects of last year’s earthquake on the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant in Japan actually demonstrate just how robust nuclear power plants are, when subjected to the terrible destructive power of an earthquake, something that is capable of razing entire cities.
Next up, we’ve got a picture of a Hiroshima bombing victim with terrible thermal burns.
This has got nothing, absolutely nothing at all, to do with Indian Point, Entergy, or nuclear energy at all.
In war, especially the most terrible of wars, as the second world war was, many civilians suffer terribly as a result of war – and civilians and soldiers alike suffer terrible thermal burns, as well as all sorts of other injuries even before the advent of nuclear weapons, and after the advent of nuclear weapons, with nuclear weapons, or without nuclear weapons.
I’d like to see a world without wars at all.
“incredibly heart wrenching photographs of the fallout area in and around Chernobyl”
This has got nothing, absolutely nothing at all, to do with Indian Point, Entergy, or nuclear energy at all, aside from the large-scale production of weapons-grade plutonium in the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War, with electricity being produced by the nuclear reactors as well, using extremely dangerous, unstable nuclear reactor technology, with no type of containment vessel around the nuclear reactor at all, that would never have been approved or licenced in the United States or anywhere else outside the Soviet Union, at any point in history.
Atomic Insights reports that Kentucky state Senator Bob Leeper has been doing some reading and listening lately about the coming of a new wave of nuclear plant construction, and he is working to position his state as a potential site for consideration. He has recently introduced a bill that would change the language in the law to allow licensed on site storage as a means of safely handling the byproducts that remain after using fuel in a reactor for a period of time, as compared with current Kentucky law which precludes the construction of a new nuclear power plant until there is a licensed and available location for permanent disposal of used nuclear fuel or the radioactive waste which may be left following recycling of such used fuel, such as the Yucca Mountain facility under development in the United States.
Of course, some people, such as Joseph Mangano, executive director of the Radiation and Public Health Project, a name that those with their finger on the pulse of nuclear energy policy in the United States and elsewhere will have heard before, has other ideas:
“One problem with nuclear reactors is what to do with the high-level waste they produce. This waste is actually a cocktail of chemicals such as Cesium-137, Iodine-129, Strontium-90 and Plutonium-239, each radioactive and cancer-causing.”
There’s no way that it is appropriate to call these kinds of materials waste – they are radionuclides with useful and important technological, scientific and industrial applications. Of course, if we greatly expand the use of nuclear fission as an energy source throughout the world, along with the recycling and efficient re-use of the materials contained within irradiated nuclear fuels, it is likely that the inventories of such fission products thus created will ultimately dwarf demand for some of these radioactive materials – and it could be decided that these surplus quantities might be moved to deep underground storage, either for very long term storage, or permanant disposal.
“The waste decays slowly, remaining in dangerous amounts for thousands of years, and must be kept from escaping into the air, water and food supply”
Relatively short lived fission products, such as caesium-137 and strontium-90, with half-lives of 30 years and 29 years respectively, must be isolated from the environment for around 300 years, not thousands of years.
Longer lived fission products, such as iodine-129, one of the very longest lived of the fission product nuclides, can have half-lives of millions of years – with correspondingly smaller specific activities, and in most cases, much smaller nuclear fission yields. Some such long-lived fission products, such as I-129 and technetium-99, have sufficiently large neutron capture cross sections such that destruction of the radioactive nuclide by way of nuclear transmutation in a nuclear reactor is feasable.
I get especially bothered when these people talk of plutonium-239 and “waste” in the same sentence – it is one of the most potent, most energy dense, and most useful fuels known to humankind. There is absolutely no way that it should ever be thought of as “waste”, and it should not be wasted.
“Another potential health problem is a large-scale release of radioactivity from a meltdown. Accidents have occurred at several reactors, including the 1986 total meltdown at Chernobyl and the 1979 partial meltdown at Three Mile Island. But in addition to accidents, a terrorist attack could also cause a meltdown. Safe evacuation would be impossible, and local residents would be exposed to toxic radiation, causing many thousands to suffer from radiation poisoning and cancer.”
The Chernobyl disaster was not a meltdown in the usual sense of the term – it was a disaster triggered by complete destruction of the reactor core caused by a massive, explosive power excursion and steam explosion, not a fuel damage accident caused by a loss of coolant accident.
The design, operation and physical characteristics of the RBMK power reactors at Chernobyl during the era of the Soviets have absolutely nothing to do with the operation of the commercial nuclear power industry in the world today. The Chernobyl disaster is absolutely irrelevant, it has absolutely no relevance at all, to the use of light water reactors in the commercial nuclear power industry in the United States today.
No accident even remotely comparable to the Chernobyl accident, which, in the absence of any kind of real containment around the nuclear reactor, spewed radioactivity from the destroyed reactor core for thousands of miles, has ever occured in the commercial nuclear power industry in the Western world.
At Three Mile Island, where a loss of coolant accident and partial meltdown occurred in 1979, was safe evacuation impossible? Were local residents exposed to “toxic radiation”? What dose of ionizing radiation did they receive? This was what is usually claimed as the most dangerous nuclear power reactor accident ever in the United States – did it cause “many thousands to suffer from radiation poisoning and cancer”? Did it harm anyone?
“Although it has never had a nuclear power reactor, Kentucky is no newcomer to nuclear plants. The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant has been enriching uranium for nuclear weapons and reactors since 1952 — and contaminating the local environment for decades.”
Does the USEC Paducah plant produce HEU for nuclear weapons applications? That’s an open question to my readers – I’d like to know the answer.
What evidence, is there, that Paducah has been “contaminating the local environment for decades“? Is there any evidence of health or ecological effects on the surrounding community?
Local residents have breathed, drunk or eaten these contaminants, and they may have suffered. In the past quarter century, the death rate in the four closest counties (Ballard and McCracken in Kentucky, Massac and Pulaski in Illinois) is about 9 percent above the U.S. rate for both whites and blacks. This amounts to nearly 3,000 “excess” deaths in a population of only 95,000. The four counties have no obvious health risk, like language barriers, lack of education or extreme poverty, so Paducah must be considered as a potential factor in these high rates.
Kentucky already has the highest cancer death rate of any state in the nation. There is no need to increase cancer risk by introducing a hazardous means of producing electricity.
Has any scientific, peer-reviewed, epidemiological study of health, death and disease, and the aetiology of any such abnormalities, in these counties ever been performed?
Is there any evidence, peer-reviewed scientific evidence of any kind, that nuclear energy is a “hazardous means of producing electricity” which “increases cancer risk”?